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A B S T R A C T   
The transition from a response-based paradigm to an anticipative, prevention-based approach remains a stub-
born challenge in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). Whilst the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(UNDRR) has advocated the latter since the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction in the 1990s, 
many countries have been slow to move from a response-focused approach to a preventative one. International 
policy guidelines have successfully informed the national DRR policies in various countries; however, their 
further translation down to the regional and local level is full of complex political challenges, exacerbated in 
many areas by an increased frequency of disasters. In this paper we explore the case of India, using the example 
of landslide risk management. Through an analysis of the evolution of landslide risk governance during the last 
two decades in two hilly regions – Darjeeling in the Himalayas and the Nilgiris in the Western Ghats – we 
demonstrate that while the national government appears to have made considerable efforts to move in line with 
the UNDRR approaches, the eventual outcome of these efforts at the regional and local level is largely an in-
cremental improvement on the existing DRR approach and not a paradigm shift in understanding and addressing 
disaster risk. We argue that overcoming these issues requires attentiveness to a situated understanding of di-
sasters and institutions at the local level, and not treating apparent gaps between policy and action as functional 
challenges to be overcome with new science from national level.   
1. Introduction 
A conceptual shift towards anticipatory management of disasters 
began in the mid-1970s, as the culmination of a change in comprehen-
sion of disasters from ‘acts of God’ to social phenomena [1,2]. Before this 
point, the international effort was largely reactive, institutionalised 
through bodies such as the United Nations Disaster Relief Office, created 
in 1971 to promote the ‘study, prevention, control, and prediction of 
natural disasters’ [3]; emphasis added). This conceptualization of di-
sasters as ‘natural’ underwent a slow transition through the Interna-
tional Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) during the 1990s 
– notably within the Yokohoma Strategy for a Safer World (1994) [4] – 
and subsequently the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(UNISDR) in 2000, renamed in 2019 as the UNDRR. A shift in focus 
towards viewing disasters as social and the increasing emphasis placed 
on disaster preparedness (as opposed to responsiveness) was further 
institutionalised with the introduction of the Hyogo Framework for 
Action in 2005, and in 2015 with the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction with its four action priorities related to understanding 
and strengthening disaster governance to manage disaster risk, and 
‘Building Back Better’ in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction [5]. 
The current UN terminology regards Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) as 
‘the policy objective of disaster risk management’, with disaster risk 
management being the application of DRR strategies to prevent, reduce 
and manage disaster risk [6]. 
Echoing these shifts within the UN, India underwent a major shift in 
its approach towards disasters in 2005 with the introduction of the 
Disaster Management Act (referred as ‘the Act’ from here on) [7,8][9], 
like many countries in the mid-2000s [10–12]. Nationally, major di-
sasters such as the earthquakes of Uttarkashi (1991), Latur (1993) and 
Chamoli (1999), the Assam floods (1998), and the Orrisa Super Cyclone 
(1999), pressed home the need to rethink the state of disaster 
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management in the country [8,13–15]. A High-Powered Committee on 
disaster management was constituted by the Central Government in 
1999 to develop India’s holistic approach towards ‘natural’ disasters, 
later extended to accommodate ‘man-made disasters’. The report of the 
committee was submitted in 2001, the year of the Gujarat Bhuj earth-
quake, and the Bill made into an Act in 2005 following the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami (2004) [13,14]. The Act was followed by the National Policy on 
Disaster Management (2009) [16] (hereafter called ‘the Policy’) – 
guided by the Hyogo Framework (2005–2015) – and the National 
Disaster Management Plan (‘the Plan’), introduced in 2016 and revised 
in 2019 [17,18], based on the Sendai Framework [19]. 
Research exploring the extent to which the Hyogo and Sendai 
Frameworks are being implemented in developing countries has argued 
that, beyond the formal commitment to the declarations and high-level 
meetings, compliance with the commitments remain problematic 
[20–23]. Similar arguments have been made in Indian media regarding 
the efficacy of the Act, Policy and Plan, following several devastating 
floods between 2013 and 2020 [24,[25]. In this paper we explore this 
apparent lack of ‘compliance’ with the Act, through interviews with 
officials, Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and first-responders 
involved in landslide risk management in two mountainous districts in 
India1: the Nilgiris and Darjeeling. We argue that, whilst the 2004 
tsunami may have precipitated the publication of the Act, it cannot be 
viewed as a ‘critical juncture’ in DRR in India [26]. Rather, shifts in 
policy approaches at the national level have made few meaningful 
changes to DRR ‘on the ground’, due to institutional inertia and a failure 
to understand the situated context within which disaster management 
institutions operate at the local level. A change in focus towards inte-
grating national-level management with a bottom-up, situated approach 
to disaster management in India is instead the paradigm shift that is 
required. 
1.1. Appraising the act 
In the following section we review existing literature on disaster 
governance in India since the Act. Much of this literature tends to assess 
the Act’s effectiveness in terms of new institutions that have been 
created since its introduction. Studies have identified the operational 
struggles faced by these new institutions such as lack of funds available 
to them, and duplication of efforts and hierarchical conflicts between 
different agencies. Gupta [14], for instance, traces the journey of 
disaster management governance in India and argues that ‘the Indian 
disaster management policy is geared to make a paradigm change from 
response and calamity relief to disaster prevention, preparation and 
mitigation’ (pp.58-59). However, he goes on to argue the need for ‘a 
major audit of institutional setups, laws and policy implementation tools 
in the backdrop of success-failure yardsticks of the major disasters in the 
recent past’, indicating the need to address issues of ‘overlapping au-
thority, lack of adequate staffing and clarity around fund distribution’ 
[14] (p.43). Pande and Pande [27] argue that states are claiming funds, 
under disaster headings, for activities which they should be funding on 
their own, thus not following central government’s guidelines properly. 
This paper was published immediately after the introduction of the Act 
(2005) and mentions the institutions established by it as a promising 
aspect of disaster management in India. More recent works such as Pal 
and Tarun [28] applaud the Act for ‘heralding paradigm shift in disaster 
management from post-event to one of pre-event prevention, mitigation 
and preparedness’ (p.75) but focus only on disaster response mecha-
nisms, without addressing how changes in institutional function might 
have brought about this ‘paradigm shift’. 
The key trend shown by much of this literature is to appreciate the 
Act, Policy and Plan for their intentions, and present issues identified in 
their implementation as functional challenges which need to be fixed; 
that is, issues in implementation that can be overcome with time and 
with some minor changes to disaster governance at the local level (see 
also [29–31]). The continued presence of institutions created at the 
national, state and district level is used to argue that a ‘paradigm shift’ 
has been achieved for disaster management in India, without a critical 
analysis of their (dis)functionality and the exact nature of any changes 
since the Act. This framing tends to underplay the cultural, political, 
bureaucratic, and epistemic context within which the Act was intro-
duced. Here, some reviews of the Act in the legal studies literature are 
stronger because they question the real strength of this legislation in the 
Indian bureaucratic context [8,32,33]. Thattai et al. [34]; for example, 
argue that a lack of proper interagency co-ordination prevents imple-
mentation of the changes introduced by the Act. Similarly, Carter and 
Pozarny [35] – comparing the National Disaster Management Author-
ities in three countries (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) – argue that 
there is a need to link national-level agencies with local NGOs, not only 
for response but also during the preparatory and mitigation phase (that 
is, before a disaster). 
This paper takes these points further, to argue that the institutional 
structure introduced by the Act cannot be assessed independently of the 
political, bureaucratic, and, importantly, epistemic context in which it is 
expected to operate. This paper utilises frameworks from geography, 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) and the DRR literature to explore 
this gap between policy and action. Using the example of landslide 
management in two districts – Darjeeling in the northeast Himalayas 
(West Bengal) and the Nilgiris in the Western Ghats (Tamil Nadu) – we 
explore recent shifts in DRR in India at the local level. The field work in 
these two study districts was carried out over a period of 3 months 
spread across January 2018 and February 2020, and 35 interviews were 
conducted during this period. These interviews were analysed using 
thematic analysis along with a desk-based review of the Policy and Plan 
documents. Through this we argue that India has not undergone a 
‘paradigm shift’ in its approach towards disasters; rather, it has seen a 
patchy and incremental improvement in its existing response-based 
approach and has not yet made a transition towards prevention and 
anticipation. The language of substantial change is used at national 
level, but the local institutional reality is deeply rooted in the institu-
tional context informed by the response-oriented ‘natural’ conceptuali-
zation of disasters. This argument has important implications for 
managing expectations from the Act, Policy and Plan, which remain very 
high despite the well-documented shortcomings. It also shows, more 
widely, the challenges of enforcing change purely from a national level 
in DRR: policy changes cannot necessarily overcome the institutional 
inertia of local government, which requires a deeper cultural and 
epistemic shift in managing disaster risk at the local level. 
Section 2 provides the theoretical framework of the study; section 3 
shares in detail the methodological approaches used; and section 4 
provides a review of the Policy, Plan, and the Act to highlight tensions in 
the institutional structure for disaster management at the national level 
post the introduction of the Act. These arguments are supported by in-
terviews carried out for this study with disaster management officials 
and NGOs operating at the national level. Section 5 focuses specifically 
on the disaster governance in the two study areas (Darjeeling and the 
Nilgiris), providing details about the institutional structure of disaster 
management at the local level. This section derives from interviews and 
participant observation gathered during three months of fieldwork in 
the two study areas, and documentary analysis of State and District 
Disaster Management Plans. In section 6 we analyse the observations 
from the national level (shared in section 4) and local level (shared in 
section 5) to tie it together with the theoretical framework of the study. 
Lastly, in section 7 we share the concluding remarks. 
1 Here we follow the UNDRR definition of landslides as ‘a variety of processes 
that result in the downward and outward movement of slope-forming materials, 
including rock, soil, artificial fill, or a combination of these. The materials may 
move by falling, toppling, sliding, spreading, or flowing.’ 
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2. Theoretical framework 
This paper explores why India continues to struggle with disasters 
despite the shift in institutional focus at the national level. At heart, the 
issue is the struggle in translating the intent of international policy 
discourse into action on the ground – a widely recognised problem in 
DRR [36,37]. The knowledges that feed into the production of inter-
national policy and United Nations frameworks can be integrated into 
national-level policy, but actioning these ideas in local contexts remains 
a key challenge; these knowledges are generic and not specific – and 
they often do not speak into local realities, cultures and communities 
[38]. This issue is not unique to DRR – it is also being strongly felt in the 
related fields of sustainable development and climate change research. 
In these fields this gap is often referred to as scale discordance. 
Scale discordance is defined as the mismatch occurring when avail-
able scientific information, or other formal knowledges, does not reflect 
the unique context of the environmental conditions and/or the 
geographic scale for decision-making [39]. This concept has been used 
to understand the struggles in introducing internationally/globally 
constituted knowledges into locally situated contexts [40]. For example, 
commenting on the difference in global and local perspectives and the 
attempts at using one (global) to guide the other (local) in climate 
change context, STS scholar Sheila Jasanoff [41] argues that a homog-
enising global understanding ‘detaches global fact from local value, 
projecting a new, totalising image of the world as it is, without regard for 
the layered investments that societies have made in the worlds as they 
wish them to be. It therefore destabilises knowledge at the same time 
that it seeks to stabilise it’ (p.236). Building on this, Mike Hulme [42] 
argues that having detached/decontextualized facts (a global perspec-
tive) without the corresponding meaning (local perspective) fails to do 
justice to the challenges faced in lived everyday life at a local level, and 
may even be of less use in problem solving/policy making in comparison 
to the local tools. Tim Ingold [43] argues that the distinction between 
the global and local perspective is not one of hierarchical degree but one 
of kind. The local perspective is one of engagement with the world in 
which we live, whereas the global stems from a detached, disinterested 
and decontextualized observation of the world [43]. 
Comprehending and capturing the ‘local perspective’ as being 
different in kind – and not just a narrowly- focused interpretation of the 
‘global’ – requires a theoretical framework that provides the scope to 
conceptualise perspectives outside of the ‘global’/‘local’ divide, viewing 
these as context-specific. Here we utilise STS scholar Donna Haraway’s 
[44] concept of situated knowledges as a fruitful lens through which to 
understand scale discordance in DRR policy and practice. Haraway uses 
this concept to question the authority of science as a body of knowledge. 
Science, according to Haraway, with its decontextualized worldview, 
claims authority by being placeless (not situated in any specific context). 
She instead calls for situating science by recontextualising it alongside 
other bodies of knowledge to let a real interconnected view of the world 
emerge. 
In this study we use situated knowledges to understand how the 
political, institutional, and bureaucratic context of a particular region – 
as well as the worldviews, values and knowledges of the populations 
who live there – guide the way that disasters are managed in the region, 
and hence shape the interpretation of national and international policy 
guidelines (which themselves reflect their places of origin, whether 
capital city or Geneva for example). As such, the paper makes a larger 
argument about the problematic inherent in introducing internationally 
recommended policy guidelines into locally situated specific contexts. 
We argue that translating the paradigm shifts recommended by these 
guidelines into action on the ground requires unpacking the positional 
perspectives of the existing paradigms. Attempts at implementing 
globally informed policy goals without the acknowledgement of the 
situated positional perspective, and the corresponding epistemic values, 
lead to gaps in policy and actions. 
3. Methodology: about this study 
This study builds on the institutional mapping of disaster manage-
ment in India carried out for the LANDSLIP (Landslide multi-hazard risk 
assessment, preparedness, and early warning in South Asia: integrating 
meteorology, landscape, and society) project. LANDSLIP is a UK Natural 
Environment Research Council (NERC) and Foreign, Commonwealth 
and Development Office (FCDO) funded project which aims to produce a 
Landslide Early Warning System for two study sites in India: the Nilgiris 
District in the Tamil Nadu State of South India and Darjeeling District 
(with East Sikkim, not included here) in West Bengal State of Eastern 
India. Fig. 1 shows the two study sites on the map of India. Both study 
districts are highly susceptible to landslide risk, causing major disrup-
tion during monsoon seasons through damage to infrastructure and 
property and occasionally lost lives. Multiple demand-oriented studies 
on landslides have already been carried out in both the study areas 
[45–49]. However, these works focus on landslide as a hazard and do not 
engage with the institutional structure available to address landslide risk 
in the two regions. 
Both the study sites are hill districts in states with primarily plain 
areas, with heavy economic reliance on tourism and tea plantations. 
Darjeeling District – and the adjoining Kalimpong District that separated 
from Darjeeling in 2017 – are unique within West Bengal due to their 
geography and culture, being Himalayan districts in a state dominated 
by plains, and populated by communities of Nepali heritage. Commu-
nities here have been demanding a separate state of Gorkhaland for over 
three decades, due to their cultural differences from the majority Bengali 
population of West Bengal. This demand has resulted in violent protests 
on several occasions (1986–1988, 2017). Over time these protests have 
facilitated a tripartite agreement between central government, state 
government and local political parties, resulting in the formation of the 
Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA), a semi-autonomous body 
responsible for the development initiatives of the hill communities 
[50–53]. The GTA is a relatively unique form of local governance which 
does not report to the district administration but works alongside it, 
reporting directly to state authorities. 
The Nilgiris District is one of only a handful of hilly districts in Tamil 
Nadu. Much of the population identifies with one of several tribal groups 
in the region, yet most of the population speaks Tamil. In contrast with 
Darjeeling, therefore, the Nilgiris are relatively politically stable. More 
importantly, unlike Darjeeling district the Nilgiris district is not a border 
region, and the region does not have the same history of in-migration. 
The granulitic Nilgiris Hills are also considerably older than the Hima-
layas, with slopes that are generally shallower and landslides that are 
less intense. However, the Nilgiris receives rainfall in both the south- 
west and north-east monsoon, so the landslide season runs almost 
Fig. 1. LANDSLIP study sites in India. Figure produced by the LANDSLIP 
consortium and reproduced with permission. 
A. Ogra et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 63 (2021) 102428
4
continuously from June to December. The different political, cultural, 
and geographical contexts of the two study sites therefore provide an 
interesting backdrop for comparing the implementation of the Act, 
Policy and Plan. For this study field work was carried out mostly at the 
district level, and to a limited extent at the state and national level. 
Approximately three months were spent in the field between January 
2018 and February 2020 and 35 interviews conducted. Table 1 provides 
a broad overview of interviewee distribution in the two study areas. 
In addition to those mentioned in Table 1, three people with expe-
rience of working with disaster management at the national level were 
interviewed in Delhi. Four additional people belonging to government 
organisations not directly involved in disaster management but pro-
ducing research studies on land and land use were interviewed in the 
Nilgiris. Interviewees were selected from a desk-based review of disaster 
management plan documents, which identified key actors in the area. 
The interviews were conducted under the ethical approval (LRS-16/ 
17–487) received from King’s College London for the research, and 
either written or verbal consent was gathered from each interviewee. 
The interviews were semi-structured by design; however, to ensure that 
all the interviews have common purpose they were given a broad 
structural outline with commonality in question themes. Most of the 
interviews were conducted in English with some Hindi, the first lan-
guages of the lead author. Some interviews in the Nilgiris were con-
ducted in Tamil; interviews here were facilitated by our local research 
partner, the local NGO Keystone Foundation, and translated into 
English. 
Additional observational fieldwork was carried out in both research 
areas, which included being a participant observer in meetings between 
the district and block level officers on Disaster Management Plans. In-
terviews and policy documents were analysed using thematic analysis, 
focusing on the themes of how early warnings are generated, dissemi-
nated and used in the study areas, the established protocols for disaster 
management, and how these protocols are interpreted or translated on 
the ground. 
4. Disaster governance at the national level 
Prior to the Act, the institutional structure for disasters in India was 
entirely response-driven, focussed on relief, rescue, and financial assis-
tance. Relief and rescue operations were coordinated primarily at the 
district level by the District Collector/District Magistrate (different 
names for the same position: the most senior official in the district 
administration) and at the state level by the State Relief Commissioner 
(SRC), reporting directly to the Chief Secretary. At the national level, 
disasters were handled by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).2 During 
large-scale disasters, financial assistance for the affected state were 
administered from the National Calamity Contingency Funds (NCCF) 
and Calamity Relief Fund (CRF), following a visit to the affected area by 
a specially commissioned Inter-Ministerial Group and answered by a 
Central Relief Commissioner within the MHA, answering to a National 
Crises Management Committee (NCMC) [29]. Whilst the basic re-
sponsibility for undertaking rescue, relief, and rehabilitation remained 
that of the concerned state governments – with the central government 
primarily providing financial assistance3 – the Act introduced various 
new institutions at the national, state and district levels respectively to 
drive this shift. Significantly the Act replaced the temporary committees 
formed during a disaster with the following permanent institutions:  
a) At the national level: National Disaster Management Authority 
(NDMA), National Executive Committee (NEC), National Institute for 
Disaster Management, National Disaster Response Force.  
b) At the state level: State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA) and 
State Executive Committee along with State Disaster Response Force 
(SDRF).  
c) At the district level: District Disaster Management Authority 
(DDMA). 
The Policy (2009) and Plan (2016, 2019) were introduced to oper-
ationalise the Act. Whilst the Policy was oriented more towards miti-
gation than preparedness, response, or recovery, the language within the 
Plan – first introduced in 2016 and then revised in 2019 – suggests an 
approach that is primarily preparedness- and response-driven.4 The 
legislation designed to facilitate the implementation of the Act therefore 
already provide an indication that the paradigm shift envisaged by the 
Act has not occurred. Furthermore, whilst the Act asked central gov-
ernment to set up a National Disaster Response Fund and a National 
Disaster Mitigation Fund, only the Response Fund has been created, by 
drawing upon the already existing NCCF and the CRF. The government 
has not constituted the National Disaster Mitigation Fund, arguing that 
ongoing schemes take care of mitigation measures, negating the need for 
a separate fund for it [54]. 
4.1. Institutional friction and the amendment to the act 
The weakening of the intended aims of the Act relates partly to 
conflicts within central government created by the institutions that it 
mandated. Bose [55]; Mathur and Bhattacharya [56]; Bhattacharya 
(1974), Mathur [57]; and Cohen and Raghavulu [58] have argued that 
the Indian democratic political system – much like other countries – is 
always alert to the opportunities a disaster context offers in terms of 
political mobilization, and this is true of disaster funding as well. In 
particular, the distribution of the NCCF is open to political influence, 
with Kumar [59] arguing that resources are directed towards floating 
parties: political parties that are likely to make or change affiliations 
based on benefits. Das and Jha [60]highlight one such notable inci-
dence, related to provisions of additional central assistance to Orissa 
(now Odisha) in the wake of the super-cyclone of 1999. At this time the 
Eleventh Finance Commission explicitly noted that the centre’s reluc-
tance to declare the Orissa super-cyclone as a national calamity and 
provide adequate assistance may have had a political motivation with 
the centre and state controlled by different political parties. The Act was 
therefore introduced in a context where relief funds were apparently 
open to political manipulation. 
The new institutional structure proposed by the Act was introduced 
partly to circumvent these issues, through the establishment of a 
Table 1 
List of interviewees with disaster management officials and experts in the two 
study areas.  
Respondents Darjeeling Nilgiris 
Government officials (state/district/sub-district) 7 11 
NGO members 2 1 
Community members/first responders 6 2  
2 Before this by the Union Ministry of Agriculture. 
3 These were based on the recommendation of the Finance Commission of 
India, a constitutionally mandated body at the central level, responsible for 
evaluating the state of finances of the union and state governments along with 
laying down the principles determining the distribution of financial assistance 
from the centre to the states.  
4 The Policy has in total nine objectives of which five are mitigation focused, 
two aimed at improving preparedness and one each for response and recovery. 
However, as we move on to the Plan, which was designed to translate these 
objectives into actionable strategies on the ground, we find the term ‘mitiga-
tion’ used only four times as opposed to the term ‘response’ which figures 339 
times throughout the Plan. 
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permanent NDMA, chaired by the Prime Minister and administered by a 
nine-member board of nominated experts from the field of disaster 
management.5 As per the Act, one of these nine members was to become 
the Vice-Chair, who would have the status of a Cabinet Minister, and the 
other eight members were to have the Minister-of-State status (Act 
2005). This new status for the NDMA created a hierarchical struggle 
between elected Cabinet Ministers and the nominated Board members of 
the NDMA.6 A national-level DRR advisor shared that there was clear 
bureaucratic and political inertia resisting the change introduced by the 
Act in the institutional hierarchy for disaster management. For him this 
was evident in the struggles they faced to get the basic administrative 
work done through MHA, which was the sole authority for addressing 
disasters prior to the Act. These everyday struggles were, according to 
him, characteristic of the existing system’s reluctance to let a strong 
NDMA emerge.7 
Additionally, under the previous system, the Cabinet Secretary that 
headed the NCMC would report directly to Cabinet Ministers. In the new 
order, the Cabinet Secretary also headed the NEC, which was to assist 
the NDMA in its actions, effectively meaning that the Cabinet Secretary 
would be reporting to two bodies: the Ministry of Home Affairs and the 
NDMA. This created the potential for substantial bureaucratic and po-
litical stalemate.8 A special task force was constituted by the MHA in 
2013 to address these hierarchical mismatches, reporting that the 
‘functioning of institutional entities created under the Act at all levels 
were being reportedly constrained by a lack of clarity on the roles as well 
as by structural anomalies, dearth of human resources and inadequate 
infrastructure’ [29] (p.ix). The response to this was to portion out the 
roles between the Ministry of Home Affairs and the NDMA, with the 
NDMA responsible for the formation and implementation of policies 
relating to prevention, mitigation and preparedness, and coordination of 
a disaster response with the states conducted by Ministry of Home Af-
fairs. This therefore institutionalised the separation of mitigation and 
prevention measures from preparedness and response. 
Based on the recommendations of this special task force, the Act was 
amended in 2013. The amendment was followed by downgrading the 
status of the Vice-Chair of the NDMA from Cabinet Minister to Cabinet 
Secretary and the status of other members from Minister-of-State to 
Secretary. The total number of members were reduced from nine to 
four/five. With this amendment, the Vice-Chair became subordinate to 
the Cabinet Ministers. This downgrading received considerable media 
coverage and was seen as a systematic weakening of an established 
institution [61–65]. Online research revealed no further Vice-Chair 
appointments since the amendment, possibly indicating an attempt to 
avoid any further power conflicts between the Cabinet Secretary and the 
Vice-Chair of the NDMA. 
4.2. Summary 
In summary of the above, Fig. 2 shows the current operational hi-
erarchy for disaster management in India at the national level. This di-
agram has been developed on the back of communication pathways 
diagram given in the Plan (2019). It should be noted that the pathways 
(arrows) we present here are not identical to that presented in the Plan; 
rather it has been modified based on information gathered from the 
interviews. The diagram provided in the Plan represents an ideal insti-
tutional pathway for coordination, decision making and communica-
tion; it does not highlight any chain of command. Conversely, Fig. 2 
highlights the chain of command (with orange-coloured arrows) and 
some of the additional pathways of communication (grey coloured 
lines). It shows the disaster management institutional structure to be 
top-down in its approach, as has been argued previously in the literature 
[66,67]. The NDMA, looking after mitigation, is subordinate to the 
MHA, which manages disaster response. This is indicative of the pref-
erence given to response over mitigation within the new institutional 
structure at the national level. Additionally, we see that the crises 
committee – which had been representative of response-oriented 
approach towards disasters before the introduction of the Act – has 
continued to command the DM institutional structure even after the 
introduction of the Act, especially during a disaster event. 
5. Disaster governance at the local and regional level 
This section outlines changes to disaster management in the Nilgiris 
and Darjeeling districts since the introduction of the Act, Policy and 
Plan. The section focusses specifically on a) the institutional structure 
for DRR in these two study areas, including financial resources available 
for DRR; and b) the state and disaster management plans. 
5.1. Nilgiris District 
5.1.1. Institutional structure for DRR 
5.1.1.1. At the state level. In Tamil Nadu, disaster management comes 
under the Commissionerate of Revenue Administration, Disaster Man-
agement and Mitigation, within the Revenue Department. The 
commissioner of this Commissionerate is also the State Relief Commis-
sioner (SRC). The chain of command remains largely unchanged since 
before the introduction of the Act, with the SRC overseeing relief op-
erations throughout the state, and incidence information and relief 
requirement provided by District Collectors, who also head the disaster 
management operations at the district level.9 The institutional structure 
for disaster management outlined in the Tamil Nadu State Disaster 
Management Plan [68] is as follows: the government has constituted 
Tamil Nadu State Disaster Management Authority (TN-SDMA), recently 
renamed as Tamil Nadu Disaster Risk Reduction Agency (TN-DRRA). 
The TN-SDMA/TN-DRRA works under the chairmanship of the Chief 
Minister. A State Emergency Operation Centre (SEOC) functions under 
the command of the SRC to disseminate early warnings and alerts 
received from the Indian Meteorological Department, Central Water 
Commission, Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services, 
and other agencies to district administration. However, the TN-SDMA 
was officially constituted in November 2013 almost eight years after 
the introduction of the Act [69]. 
The Act mandates state governments to create a State Disaster 
Response Fund (SDRF), District Disaster Response Fund (DDRF), State 
Disaster Mitigation Fund (SDMF) and District Disaster Mitigation Fund 
(DDMF) (Act, 2005), mirroring the creation of the same financial 
structure at the national level. The purpose of the SDRF is for state 
governments to meet the expenditure of providing immediate relief to 
the victims (NDMA website). This is constituted jointly by Government 
of India and the State Government, in the ratio of 75:25 [68]. Based on 
the recommendations of the Thirteenth Finance Commission, central 
government transferred CRF funds to SDRF and the CRF ceased to exist 
as on March 31, 2010 [70]. This indicates that the CRF has merely been 
renamed, and the same funds are being used for response measures 
under a different name. The TN-SDMP further states that the remaining 
three funds (SDMF, DDRF and DDMF) have not yet been constituted, 
with no clear timeline for when they will be constituted. The TN-SDMP 
instead suggests that certain flexible funds available under other cen-
trally sponsored schemes can be potentially directed towards mitigation 
and DRR activities. This demonstrates both the persistence of the insti-
tutional structure that existed prior to the Act and continued focus 5 Interview with national-level disaster response expert 1, January 2018  
6 Interview with national-level DRR advisor expert 2, January 2018.  
7 Interview with national-level DRR advisor expert 2, January 2018.  
8 Interview with national-level disaster response expert 3, January 2018 9 Interview with state-level senior DRR official, Tamil Nadu September 2018 
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primarily on disaster response. 
5.1.1.2. At the district level. The Plan identifies the DDMA, constituted 
under the Chairmanship of the District Collectors, as the planning, 
coordinating, and implementing body at the district level. The DDMA in 
the Nilgiris operates through the Revenue Administration, which in-
cludes three Revenue Divisions and six Revenue Taluks10. The District 
Collector is a kingpin for all administrative matters at the district level, 
assisted by the District Revenue Officer and the Personal Assistant 
(General) who are also members of DDMA. Each Revenue Division is 
headed by a Revenue Divisional Officer and each taluk is headed by a 
Tehsildar. Fig. 3 diagrammatically represents three Revenue Divisions 
and the corresponding Revenue Taluks in the Nilgiris. 
Interviewees at the state and district-level identified following sig-
nificant changes in disaster management since the Act:  
• regular meetings with the first responders’ team;  
• the introduction of an emergency helpline number for people to call;  
• greater interdepartmental co-ordination;  
• awareness programmes; and  
• prepared evacuation centres and information dissemination through 
the SEOC. 
A senior official in the district administration spoke to us about an 
effective coordination mechanism introduced up to the local community 
level. The interviewee emphasised the importance of interdepartmental 
zonal teams formed under the leadership of the Revenue Authority, with 
team members drawn from police, fire services, rural development, 
forest, agricultural and other departments. Each team monitors five to 
seven vulnerable areas, aided by first responders at the ground level.11 
The TN-SDMP identifies these first responders as community members 
at the grassroot level, who are enrolled as able-bodied volunteers with 
skills of swimming and climbing. First responders are reported to play a 
key role in raising awareness, providing incidence information to the 
authorities and first aid to the victims before official help arrives (TN- 
SDMP, 2019). A sub-district official discussed the chain of information 
from the District Revenue Officer to first responders: 
We select ten volunteers from each of the vulnerable areas between 
the age of 25–35 years. These are young people and can help in 
rescue operations. Before south-west and north-east monsoon, we 
conduct meetings with them. We ask them to share any incidence 
report on the number 1077. We already have 22 such groups in our 
taluk. We also work with other line departments BDOs, Highways, 
Public Water Works and JCB owners. We also do training and 
awareness programmes with school students and our staff. We share 
the emergency number widely so anyone can call. We have also 
prepared one hundred and three schools which can be turned into 
shelters for evacuation. When we receive any weather warning from 
district office, we pass it onto zonal officers.12 
Our fieldwork, however, highlighted a lack of communication be-
tween government authorities and first responders. Contacting first re-
sponders directly proved difficult, as shown by the relatively low 
numbers of interviews were able to arrange. In some cases, we found 
that first responders were either not aware of their status or were merely 
told about it without much briefing. One of the common characteristics 
of the few first responders we could reach was that they were local daily 
wage workers. This meant that many responders had not attended 
training, as one first responder mentioned: 
I did once receive the training. It included activities like swimming 
and helping clear an area. However, not everyone can afford to go for 
these trainings because we are daily wage workers. To attend these 
training, we have to miss our day’s work. Only those who are keen to 
learn these skills would volunteer.13 
Fig. 2. National level disaster management institutional network with the chain of command highlighted. Orange arrows represent the chain of command and grey 
arrows additional pathways of communication. 
10 Taluk is sub-district level administrative unit.  
11 Interview with district-level senior official, the Nilgiris, September 2018. 
12 Interview with block-level senior official, the Nilgiris, September 2018.  
13 Interview with first responder, the Nilgiris, September 2018. 
A. Ogra et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 63 (2021) 102428
7
The functioning of the response-based system thus depends on the 
willingness of community members to forego pay, and it appears to 
represent an outdated allocation system that does not consider current 
circumstances. The importance of interdepartmental co-ordination was, 
however, apparently better understood. A sub-district official from the 
department of District Rural Development Authority (DRDA) – which 
supports the Revenue Department in relief work – mentioned that all his 
Deputy Officers are part of the interdepartmental zonal teams, and all 
the teams have WhatsApp groups. The alerts received from the district 
are shared immediately through these groups. Before monsoons, these 
teams inspect their respective areas and identify any trees likely to fall 
due to monsoon winds. Block offices are in a more supportive role to the 
Revenue Administration for disaster management.14 
5.1.2. State and district disaster management plan 
The disconnect between international policy and local-level disaster 
management in the Nilgiris is apparent within TN-SDMP and the Nilgiris 
District Disaster Management Plan (NDDMP). Both of these were a 
requirement of the Act, yet both follow exactly the same format as the 
national-level Plan, demonstrative of the perfunctory nature of the 
plans. In particular, the disjunct with international discourse is repre-
sented in the way that the plans use the terms ‘hazard’, ‘vulnerability’ 
and ‘risk assessment’. These terms have specific meanings within the 
UNDRR and specific relationships (risk as a function of hazard, expo-
sure, and vulnerability). This conceptualization closely informs aca-
demic research work on disasters and vulnerability [71–73]. If the 
international discourse is percolating downwards, as is intended, this 
nomenclature should therefore be reflected in the plans. 
Section 2 of the TN-SDMP deals specifically with hazard, vulnera-
bility, and risk assessment. Whilst the use of the term hazard reflects its 
use by the UNDRR – being used exclusively in relation to the physical 
trigger event like a cyclonic storm and landslide – there is a lack of 
conceptual clarity about the difference between vulnerability and risk. 
For instance, the TN-SDMP mentions that ‘the identification, assess-
ment, and mapping of the [disaster] risks are undertaken using the 
legacy data and geomorphological characters of the state’ [68](p.22). 
The NDDMP also utilises legacy data about disaster events to identify the 
vulnerable areas, conflating vulnerability with hazard. In both plans, 
vulnerability is understood through the source and cause of the hazard, 
details of the relief measure available if the hazard is triggered, and 
maintenance actions taken during the previous year to reduce the 
impact. Vulnerability assessment in the NDDMP, and risk assessment in 
TN-SDMP, are essentially demarcating the areas where disasters (land-
slides) have previously been reported. Analysis of ‘vulnerability’ 
therefore includes broad details about the hazard and status of relief 
measures available, and not the differentiated capacities of the in-
dividuals and the communities in an area in the face of the disaster, 
contrary to UNDRR definitions. Hence, although the terms vulnerability, 
hazard and risk have percolated into the State Disaster Management 
Plans (SDMP) and District Disaster Management Plans (DDMP), these 
are used in a way that reflects a response-oriented approach that does 
not consider the social determinants of vulnerability. 
5.1.3. Summary 
Since the introduction of the Act, the existing structure for disaster 
management in the Nilgiris at the district and sub-district level has been 
re-assembled in ways that improve the government authorities’ 
response efficiency. Interzonal teams, WhatsApp groups and interde-
partmental meetings before and during monsoons are valued. Similarly, 
the district government has also carried out awareness activities under 
the guidance of specific central government agencies. However, a gap in 
communication with first responders indicates that the nature of inter-
action with citizens – in the context of disaster management – has largely 
remained the same. This observation is significant in the Nilgiris, as the 
district has done some exemplary work with citizens in banning single 
use plastic in the region and has a history of effective participatory 
practices [74–77]. However, in the case of disaster management, the 
focus on interdepartmental coordination – producing disaster manage-
ment plans, establishing emergency communication centres such as the 
SEOC and DEOC – while lacking government-citizen coordination, 
highlights that the implementation of the Act is heavily top-down. 
Disaster management overall in the district is focused on achieving the 
agendas set by the centre and the state, without being attentive to the 
specific capacities of the district or allowing the district to use its indi-
vidual strengths in innovative ways. 
5.2. Darjeeling District 
5.2.1. Institutional structure 
5.2.1.1. State level. Unlike Tamil Nadu, West Bengal has a separate 
department for disaster management, the West Bengal Disaster Man-
agement and Civil Defence Department. The department carries out all 
the work assigned to the SDMA in the state, without subscribing to the 
name. The department has been in existence since 1992 and was 
rechristened from ‘Department for Relief and Rehabilitation’ to ‘Disaster 
Management and Civil Defence Department’ in 2006 after the intro-
duction of the Act (West Bengal State Website), with the operation of the 
department remaining largely the same. For financial resources, West 
Bengal also depends on NCCF and CRF grants from the centre, which 
have now been renamed as National Disaster Response Fund and State 
Disaster Response Fund respectively. 
5.2.1.2. District level. The department appoints disaster management 
officers to assist administrators at each level of administration (see 
Fig. 4). A district-level disaster management official described Sub- 
Fig. 3. The administrative hierarchy at sub-district level in the Nilgiris.  
14 Interview with block level senior official, the Nilgiris, September 2018. 
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Divisional Officers and Block Development Officers (BDOs) as signifi-
cant administrative positions reporting to the District Magistrate.15 
However, our fieldwork observations revealed that District Disaster 
Management Officer, Sub-Divisional Disaster Management Officer and 
Block Disaster Management Officer to be primarily clerical jobs, focused 
on compiling Calamity Assessment Reports,16 the Darjeeling-District 
Disaster Management Plan and distribution of relief material. Further-
more, an acute shortage in the workforce was expressed by our re-
spondents.17 For example, a block-level official commented on the 
shortage of workforce in the block disaster management department: 
I am a one-man army. Officially, am assigned two support staff and 
peon, but no one is recruited in their position. So, I end up doing 
everything. At block level we create Calamity Assessment Reports. 
This is an official record of loss suffered during the disasters. Apart 
from all this I also get requests from colleagues at GTA to look at 
some of compensation claims for house damage which they cannot 
verify because they don’t have qualified engineers.18 
As in the Nilgiris, in Darjeeling as well, the DDRF and DDMF are yet 
to be created [78] (pp.74–75). This is despite recent calls by the Fif-
teenth Finance Commission for the creation of these funds at the state 
and district level [79] (pp.235–238) Also, much like the Nilgiris, 
Darjeeling district depends on ongoing projects for indirect mitigation 
benefits, rather than having a clear institutional focus on disaster miti-
gation [78]. 
5.2.1.3. The Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA). The GTA 
constitute a small part of disaster management, limited to approval of 
House Building Grants for rehabilitation [78](p.75). They do not have 
an active role in relief and rescue operations. Commenting on the GTA’s 
role in disaster management, an official in the Disaster Management 
Division at the GTA mentioned: 
State government has allocated a House Building Grant to GTA for 
those families who have either lost their house or suffered damage to 
their house due to a disaster. They put in claim request to us. We then 
inspect these requests to gauge their authenticity and decide whether 
we want to recommend them to the state government or not. Once 
we decide that a claim is appropriate, we forward it to the state 
department in Kolkata. The state department then release the grant 
money which is transferred to the claimant.19 
This unique format of local administration adds another level of 
complexity to disaster management in Darjeeling, as distribution of 
funds for rehabilitation is handled by the GTA who do not otherwise 
participate in preparedness and response. Thus, once again we see in the 
top-down approach followed by national and then state government for 
disaster management; there is no space for the context-specific chal-
lenges faced by local administration to emerge. 
5.2.2. State and District Disaster Management Plans 
The latest version of the West Bengal SDMP [80] – available on the 
West Bengal state administration website – follows largely the same 
format as TN-SDMP, providing a hazard, risk, and vulnerability profile 
of West Bengal and then sections on mitigation, preparedness, and 
response. Unlike the TN-SDMP, the WB-SDMP provides a clear definition 
of all the three concepts, following the UNDRR. However, beyond this, 
the usage of the terms is similar to the TN-SDMP, again indicating an 
absence of a shift in conceptualising disasters towards the social com-
ponents of vulnerability. For example, the section ‘History of Vulnera-
bility’ outlines a list of past disaster events in the state, described in 
terms of hazard rather than social capacity [80] (pp.33–35). While the 
latest Darjeeling DDMP [78] does try to correlate settlement distribution 
with hazard, it is still nominal and confined to a two-page description 
(pp.14–15). 
Our fieldwork in Darjeeling included an opportunity to travel with 
district disaster management officials to various blocks and be part of 
conversations about the drafting of latest DDMP. From this we deter-
mined that the list of historical disasters in the D-DDMP is compiled from 
Calamity Assessment Reports: official records of the loss and damage 
compiled since before the introduction of the Act to identify and legit-
imate compensation claims. The West Bengal SDMP is compiled from 
these reports20. The D-DDMP further consists of a list of line departments 
involved in disaster management/response, the infrastructure available 
to handle a disaster situation and name and contact details of officers/ 
individuals in-charge in each block. However, a member of a local NGO 
commented that the DDMP was ‘a glorified telephone directory’21; a list 
of who to call in response to a hazard and essentially response focussed. 
A block-level official confirmed this: 
At block level landslides are all about distribution of tarpaulins. 
During monsoon season when landslips start occurring our first 
challenge is to ensure an even distribution of tarpaulins. It is not 
easy. People tend to take more than what they require. Technically 
they should return it after the monsoon, but nobody does, and we 
don’t have time to go around collecting them.22 
The SDMPs and DDMPs in both the states and study districts thus 
reflect the unique characters of the respective areas to a very limited 
extent and are instead largely a bureaucratic exercise directed by the 
centre and aimed at depicting a uniformity in disaster management 
Fig. 4. Administration at sub-district level in Darjeeling along with corre-
sponding disaster management officers. 
15 Interview with district-level disaster management official, Darjeeling, 
January 2018.  
16 Calamity Assessment Report is detailed account of loss of life and property 
compiled by the village and block offices and then sent to district office.  
17 From the interviews with the block level officials within the district  
18 Interview with block-level disaster management official, Darjeeling, 
January 2018. 
19 Interview with Disaster Management Official at GTA Darjeeling, October 
2018.  
20 Interview with official at district disaster management department, January 
2018.  
21 Interview with Disaster NGO member, Darjeeling, January 2018. 
22 Interview with block-level disaster management official in Darjeeling dis-
trict, January 2018. 
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approach across the country. The plans closely follow the format pre-
scribed by the national government. The plans represent no conceptual 
shift in comprehending disasters. Rather, it can be argued that the terms 
vulnerability, hazard, and risk have been appropriated into the existing 
paradigm, which has been made more efficient, but without undergoing 
any conceptual shift. 
5.2.3. Summary 
The case of Darjeeling shows:  
• Government’s continued focus on improving efficiency of response 
through preparedness along with better relief distribution 
mechanisms.  
• The interchangeable use of risk and vulnerability in the planning 
process, indicating a lack of conceptual clarity which is a primary 
requirement for bringing in the paradigm shift envisioned by the Act. 
• Continued financial support for relief, response, rescue, and reha-
bilitation, but no such framework for mitigation. 
All these factors indicate that in Darjeeling, disasters are considered 
as natural events that should be addressed retrospectively. This is also 
evidenced in the local communities’ demands from the government vis a 
vis disaster management. For instance, in 2016 a 12-hour-long strike was 
called in Mirik to protest government’s delayed rehabilitation response 
to the 2015 landslide. This protest was focussed not on preventing future 
landslides, but on administration’s failure to give the victims of the 
landslide land to rebuild their homes [81]. 
Much like the Nilgiris, therefore, disaster management in Darjeeling 
is focused on compiling Calamity Assessment Reports and disaster 
management plans along with conducting mock drills aimed at evacu-
ating affected areas, rescuing injured people and ensuring that they get 
medical assistance as soon as possible. There is little evidence of a 
conceptual shift in comprehension of disasters from a natural event to 
one created by social and economic factors. 
6. Analysis 
The following points summarises the changes that have been intro-
duced in disaster management at the state and district level since the 
introduction of the Act, Policy and Plan: 
a) Renaming the departments: Previously existing Relief and Reha-
bilitation Departments in both the study districts have been renamed 
as Disaster Management Departments, although their roles and re-
sponsibilities have remained largely the same. 
b) Disaster Management Plans: As mandated in the Act, Disaster 
Management Plans have been created at all the three levels of 
administration (national, state and district). At the district level, 
these plans constitute a comprehensive compilation of available 
response resources but have a limited focus on preparedness or 
mitigation. Both the meaning of particular terms (for example, 
vulnerability) and the conceptual understanding of their assessment 
process, are different to that intended by international policy 
guidelines. 
c) Co-ordination networks: Both districts place an emphasis on 
having an efficient coordination network for response to share early 
warnings down to the community and report incidences back to the 
authorities in time. 
d) Taking stock: In the Nilgiris District, pre-monsoon meetings are 
conducted in both districts to evaluate preparedness measures and 
take stock of resources for response.23 
e) Conducting mock drills: Mock drills are conducted to assess the 
efficiency of response measures, under the orders of State Disaster 
Management Department. A mock drill we observed in Darjeeling 
was found to be in the spirit of following orders to complete an 
assigned task; we are not aware of any assessment report prepared to 
reflect on district’s response capabilities on the back of this drill.24 
Similarly, in the Nilgiris many first-responders do not attend training 
due to the loss of daily wages. 
f) Awareness campaigns: Awareness campaigns are regularly con-
ducted in schools in the Nilgiris, although the district disaster man-
agement office in Darjeeling needed more financial resources as well 
as trained human resource to conduct such awareness campaigns.25 
A considerable number of features have, however, remained the 
same even after the introduction of the Act, Policy and Plan. These are: 
a) Workforce: In addition to the compilations of Calamity Assessment 
Reports, these changes have given Disaster Management De-
partments the additional charge of compiling SDMPs and DDMPs, 
disseminating early warnings received from the central government 
agencies, conducting mock drills, and carrying out other adminis-
trative works. However, the workforce within Disaster Management 
Departments remains largely the same. 
b) Hierarchical structure: Importantly in relation to the above, key 
decision makers and the chain of command for disaster management 
at the centre, state and district levels are the same elected and 
administrative officials. The bureaucratic system remains central to 
disaster management, with the District Collector/Magistrate coor-
dinating all components of disaster management (except for distri-
bution of House Building Grant in Darjeeling), as had been the case 
before the Act. 
c) Engagement with the community: The nature of the district ad-
ministrations’ engagement with the community has remained 
largely the same: that is, primarily top-down. Relatedly, commu-
nities’ expectations from the administration continues to be relief-, 
rescue-, and rehabilitation-oriented. Successful citizen-government 
initiatives seen in other areas of administration in the Nilgiris have 
not occurred within disaster management, due to the top-down na-
ture of policy implementation. Citizens are seen either as a source of 
first-hand incidence information or as a group able to reach the 
affected area immediately to provide first aid while the government 
help/rescue arrives. Reshaping this relation would require thinking 
of DRR beyond the individual incidences and more broadly in terms 
of vulnerability and risk. 
d) Resources: Whilst the National, State and District Disaster 
Response Funds mandated by the Act have been created by drawing 
upon the already existing NCCF and CRF, mitigation funds have not 
been constituted at any level. It is also worth noting that a recent 
order from the Government of India on financial assistance for di-
sasters speaks of SDMF/SDRF together, suggesting that no additional 
financial resources have been allocated for mitigation work separate 
from response [82]. 
Others have argued that this funding landscape is not conducive to 
the promotion of a mitigation-oriented vision of the future [19,29], and 
constrains local administrators from taking visionary actions for disaster 
mitigation ([59,60]. Whilst we agree that further funding for mitigation 
would be helpful in shifting towards UNDRR’s vision of disaster risk 
management, this alone would be unlikely to bring about a significant 
change. This lack of funding for mitigation needs to be viewed as a 
characteristic of the existing disaster management paradigm. Put 
23 Interview with district-level senior official, the Nilgiris, September 2018. 
24 This disaster management mock drill was conducted in Darjeeling on 10 
October 2018. While on the field we got a chance to witness the exercise first- 
hand.  
25 Interview with official at district disaster management department, October 
2018 
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differently, instead of seeing the factors which have worked as success 
stories – separated from the ones which have not and which in turn need 
to be ‘fixed’ – we argue that the two should be viewed as part of a single 
epistemic understanding of disasters and their local contexts. 
This paper thus argues that both the factors that have changed (that 
is, where the institutional and policy changes at the national level have 
been successful) and those that have not changed (where they have not 
been successful), should be viewed as characteristics of the existing 
disaster management paradigm within the country. To be more specific, 
taking stock of resources before the monsoon, conducting mock drills, 
and formalising coordination networks, are all essentially an exercise in 
reassembling and formalising the pre-existing setup to improve response 
efficiency. Because the focus is on reassembling, retaining, and incre-
mentally improving response, we do not see any significant change in 
the workforce, hierarchical structure, or the nature of engagement with 
the community. This argument challenges the assumptions made by 
several authors reviewed at the start of this paper [14,29–31] that the 
Act can be properly implemented merely by fixing functional challenges 
related to hierarchy, staffing and funds. We argue that this approach 
overlooks the components of the existing paradigm; understanding this 
paradigm and the context within which it operates is essential for 
introducing any kind of conceptual change in understanding and dealing 
with disasters. 
Our findings suggest that the existing paradigm is response-focused, 
viewing disasters as primarily natural events that disrupt normal life and 
result in loss of life and property (houses, agricultural land, and cattle), 
to be addressed retrospectively. This is evidenced by the lack of effort to 
bring community-focused governance into disasters in the Nilgiris, as 
has been adopted for other issues (environmental sustainability, for 
example) [83,84]. It is also exemplified in the way that ‘vulnerability’ is 
used within the local-level plans. Within a preventive paradigm, 
vulnerability is defined as the diminished capacity of an individual or 
group to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a 
hazard [6]. In the response-based paradigm witnessed here, vulnera-
bility is used interchangeably with hazard exposure: an area that has 
previously experienced a hazard is ‘vulnerable’. Moreover, at the time of 
writing, the NDMA website still classifies disasters as ‘natural’ and 
‘man-made’; natural being identified as floods, landslides, storms, and 
cyclones and man-made as nuclear, biological and chemical – while 
mainstream disaster studies have long recognised that disasters are so-
cially driven [85,86]. Local and state government narratives around 
disasters seem to be firmly entrenched and are reflected in the 
response-driven approach that persists at the local level. 
The ongoing political situation in Darjeeling further exacerbates the 
situation in that district. The parsing of response and mitigation funds 
between the district and GTA reflects an absence of long-term thinking 
in relation to disasters. Here, despite regular and often deadly land-
slides, disasters are not considered priorities in the light of the ongoing 
political situation, as manifest in our difficulties in gaining interviews 
with the District Magistrate. The risk of landslides has therefore 
apparently been naturalised, as was shown in our observations in the 
district: houses and roads built on marginal land showed evidence of 
repeated stresses from landslides, yet people brushed this off as an 
inevitability, with no expectation that the situation could change 
through, for example, better building codes. The lack of specific miti-
gation funding therefore both reflects and further entrenches the exist-
ing paradigm [19] – and is made worse in Darjeeling because of the 
fragmentation of responsibility. 
One important area that existing framings overlook is the role of 
institutional inertia within the existing power structures in maintaining 
the existing paradigm. In many cases, proposed changes to the institu-
tional landscape has merely resulted in name changes for existing de-
partments and the continuation of the existing hierarchy. Proposed new 
agencies or funds that did not fit the existing structure were either not 
created, merged with existing departments, or staffed with the same 
people holding multiple roles, sometimes leading to complicated and 
circular chains of command. The fact that these hierarchies are not 
uniform between states in India, or between districts within states, 
contributed to a decontextualization, allowing the Act, Policy and Plan 
to be interpreted in different ways rather than in accordance with its 
aims, and enabling the institutional inertia that is witnessed here. This 
has led to what Stables and Scott [87] refer to as policy ‘sloganization’, 
where the new disaster policies have not brought about the changes that 
they promise on paper due to institutional inertia, even at the national 
level. 
The importance of this decontextualization is shown in the compo-
nents of disaster risk management that have seen improvements, such as 
cyclone risk management. These are components of DRR that are in sync 
with the previous institutional structure. For example, we have seen how 
new methods have been introduced to efficiently disseminate informa-
tion and ensure quick delivery of response, such as the setting up of 
interdepartmental teams in the Nilgiris and increasing emphasis on 
compiling of the District and State Disaster Management Plans in both 
the study districts. The struggle, however, is in translating specifically 
those parts of the Policy and Plan into action which did not have pre-
cedence in the institutional landscape prior to the introduction of the 
Act: most importantly mitigation measures. In the new institutional 
structure, institutions responsible for guiding and monitoring mitigation 
are secondary and subordinate to the ones responsible for preparedness 
and response. Our results allow us only to speculate on why the insti-
tutional structure shows such inertia, although it is notable that the 
position of the District Collector/Magistrate as the most senior local 
(unelected) official was a colonial innovation, suggesting a degree of 
path dependency [88]. 
Stevenson [89] argues that decontextualization in the policy making 
process tends to ‘reify the discourse’. Reification can imply unques-
tioning faith in centralised authorities like international bodies and 
intergovernmental agreements. This is clearly visible in the Indian DRR 
policy scenario; we see a deliberate attempt to portray a break from the 
old system and the dawning of the new, for example through repeated 
reference to paradigm shift. However, in practise the old system has not 
been entirely dismantled. Here our findings contribute to other litera-
ture on the difficulties of applying the western perspective of the Sendai 
framework into the global South, where worldviews can be very 
different [90–92]. The change of approach from response to anticipation 
requires more than an institutional renaming exercise or a single policy – 
it also requires multiscalar shifts in institutional cultures and adequate 
resourcing. Ultimately, there needs to be financial assistance and 
awareness of the situated nature of risk [93]. 
The process of decontextualization can also be seen as a deliberate 
attempt at showcasing a uniformity across scale. We would add to the 
literature above, then, by drawing attention to Ingold’s [43] conceptu-
alization of scale discordance. Ingold argues that the distinction between 
global and local perspective is not one of hierarchical degree but one of 
kind. The local is not merely a focused interpretation of the global; 
rather it is based on an altogether different way of perceiving and 
engaging with the world. In the case of DRR, while global policy pre-
scriptions are based on a long-drawn theoretical conceptualization of 
disasters, the local is embedded in experience of living in and engaging 
with the everyday world. This positional perspective of the local is both 
informed by, and manifested through, institutions and the community. A 
top-down policy change which does not engage with or acknowledge the 
situated perspective of disasters is, as evident from this study, therefore 
able to introduce only selective changes which do not disrupt the status 
quo. 
7. Concluding remarks 
In the opening section of this paper, we showed how the shift from 
disaster management to DRR in the international policy guidelines was a 
slow one, based on a transition in considering disasters as ‘acts of God’ 
beyond human control to social phenomena stemming from the 
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interaction of two main components: hazards and vulnerability. This 
transition had, however, not taken place in India when the new policy 
guidelines were introduced, either nationally or locally. Rather, the 
policy transition was itself expected to introduce this conceptual change 
in the understanding of disasters. The need to introduce policies without 
having relevant conceptual grounding in the existing institutions 
resulted in an abstract and decontextualized policy discourse. 
The paper has therefore shown that examining the gap between 
policy and action for DRR in India in terms of a few functional challenges 
is an incomplete and ineffective conceptualization of the challenges 
being faced in improving India’s approach towards DRR. Our findings 
have instead shown that India’s DRR policy framework struggles in 
implementing its intentions because the policy discourse is decontex-
tualized, and shifts in understanding disasters as being driven by social 
factors have not occurred. Meeting these intensions would instead 
require a focus on a) understanding the way disasters are understood 
and experienced at the local level and b) being attentive to institutional 
inertia faced in introducing a conceptual shift in DRR. Our findings 
suggest that effective implementation of international ideas and pro-
tocols in DRR on the ground is not simply an issue of scale discordance. 
Such an understanding implies functional challenges as the roadblock in 
accomplishing the national policy intent. Rather, the failure to bring 
about a paradigm shift in DRR in India is an issue of differently assem-
bled realities at each level of decision making. Not acknowledging these 
differences and instead enforcing a rigidly top-down approach creates a 
significant institutional inertia, which is both already present and 
enabled by a decontextualized approach. Interventions instead require 
engagement with the way that disasters are understood, experienced, 
and addressed in the local context. 
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